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Summary 
 
Between 1995 and 2000, inflation-adjusted federal corporate income taxes grew 
an average of 2.0 percent a year; the annual average for state and local corporate tax 
revenue actually declined by 0.12 percent during the same period.  A number of state-
level studies have documented this decline by showing that corporations are paying a 
declining share of state taxes.  But such results are inconclusive because they do not 
control for changes in corporate profitability.  In this paper we use data from the 
National Income and Product Accounts to create a time series of corporate profits by 
state, enabling us to investigate corporate income taxes while controlling for corporate 
profits.  Our findings are striking:  out of the 42 states studied, 41 show a statistically 
significant decline in their effective corporate income tax rates between 1991 and 2001.  
The average decline for all states is 4.6 percent per year, which means that effective 
corporate income tax rates fell by a little over one-third over the decade of the 1990s and 
into 2001.  After accounting for the impact of the growth in income of S corporations, 
this means that states lost about $11 billion on corporate income tax revenue in fiscal 
2002 due to the decline in effective corporate income tax rates. 
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Declining Corporate Income Taxes in the 1990s: 
A State-by-State Analysis of Effective Tax Rates 
 
The decline in corporate income taxes at both the federal and state levels has 
been widely documented by government agencies, academic researchers and the press.  
In a recent report published by the General Accounting Office using data from the 
Internal Revenue Service, it was found that between 1996 and 2000, 61 percent of U.S.-
controlled and 71 percent of foreign-controlled corporations reported no tax liabilities 
(GAO 2004).  Among those corporations that did pay taxes, an estimated 94 percent of 
U.S.-controlled and 89 percent of foreign-controlled corporations paid less than five 
percent of their income in taxes in 2000 (Ibid.)1 These findings are not a reflection of low 
corporate profitability.  Corporate income grew at an annual average of 3.9 percent 
during this period; gross domestic product by 4.6 percent (both in inflation-adjusted 
terms).2 
 While these overall trends are troubling, there is strong evidence that conditions 
at the state level are especially severe. Between 1995 and 2000, inflation-adjusted federal 
corporate income taxes grew an average of 2.0 percent a year; the annual average for 
state and local corporate tax revenue actually declined by 0.12 percent during the same 
period.3  Work done at the Congressional Research Service has documented that much 
                                                 
1 The federal corporate income tax rate is 35 percent. 
2 See appendix for details on data and methodology.  Note that corporate income includes:  corporate 
profits before taxes with the inventory valuation adjustment and capital consumption allowance, net 
corporate interest, and business transfer payments.  GDP is based on GDP by industry. 
3 Data are from the National Income and Product Accounts.  These differences between federal and state 
revenues also speak to one explanation of the decline in corporate income tax revenue – the increasing 
of the overall decline in the average effective corporate tax rate (federal and state and 
local combined) in the latter half of the 1990s is due to declines in state and local tax 
corporate tax revenue (Maguire 2000).4  These results are compelling, but they only 
address the aggregate picture.   
A number of state-level studies have documented the declining share of 
corporate income taxes in state tax revenue, but such results are inconclusive because 
they do not control for changes in corporate profitability.  Declining shares of corporate 
income taxes may be explained by declining profits; they are not necessarily a result of 
tax cuts or tax avoidance.  But it is difficult to control for changes in state-level 
corporate profits because there is no standardized source of data on corporate profits by 
state.  This is partly because of the complexity of the typical corporation’s inter-state 
and –national activities.  In this brief we use data from the National Income and 
Product Accounts to make such estimates, creating a time series of corporate income by 
state that enables us to investigate corporate income taxes while controlling for 
corporate profits.5 
We do this by presenting state-by-state estimates of changes in effective 
corporate income tax rates (ECITR) over the course of the 1990s and into 2001, 
                                                                                                                                                             
number of Subchapter S corporations, whose profits are passed through to their owners and taxed as 
personal income.  Since these passthroughs are happening at both the state and federal levels, the large 
decline in state and local corporate income tax revenue, as compared to federal revenue, indicates that S 
corporations are not the main culprit in state declines. 
4 This research showed that the annual average corporate tax rate for the 1980s, about 28 percent, is only 
slightly higher than the annual average of the 1990s, 27 percent.  But in the last half of the 1990s, this 
average is a full percentage point lower than in the first half because of declines in state and local effective 
rates (which declined form 5.5 percent in 1990 to 3.8 percent in 1998) (Maguire 2000). 
5 A similar methodology was employed to estimate capital income by state in a recent study by the firm 
Ernst & Young (Cline, Fox, Neubig and Phillips 2004). 
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beginning with a brief review of the aggregate numbers.  ECITRs express state 
corporate income tax revenue as a proportion of corporate income.  They are a measure 
of taxation that, when considered over time, capture broad changes in the structure of 
taxation, such as changes in the statutory tax rate, the effectiveness of the state’s tax 
collection efforts, or the ability of corporations to avoid paying taxes.  All of these 
factors will change the amount of tax revenue that the state collects, and thus alter the 
effective tax rate.  Taken together, they largely reflect the public policy environment.6   
The state-level results confirm the aggregate findings that state governments are 
facing severe declines in the yield of the corporate income tax, though there is some 
variability from state to state.  Out of the 42 states with corporate income taxes we 
evaluated, 41 show a statistically significant decline in their effective corporate income 
tax rates between 1991 and 2001.  The average decline for all states is 4.6 percent per 
year, which means that effective corporate income tax rates fell by a little over one-third 
during the decade of the 1990s and into 2001.7 
 
States in Aggregate 
 Figure 1 graphs the course of the effective corporate income tax rate for the U.S. 
states in aggregate between 1977 and 2001. The gray vertical bars indicate periods of 
recession, and have been added in to illustrate the cyclical variability of the ECITR.  
                                                 
6 Economic growth may also impact effective tax rates, as discussed later on in the brief.  Thus, not all 
changes in the ECITR are directly attributable to public policy.  To address this issue, the summary 
statistics we use control for cyclical effects in one of two ways: (1) by comparing two points in time that 
reflect similar stages in the business cycle; and (2) by using regression analysis to estimate a time trend 
from one business cycle to the next. 
7 The average decline is actually a continuously compounded rate (see appendix for details). 
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That is, the effective corporate income tax rate tends to fall and rise before and after 
recessions respectively, declining well before recessions begin, and taking longer to 
recover after recessions end.  The 1990s look a bit different than the 1980s, though, in 
that the corporate tax rates peaked very early in the cycle (1994), beginning a decline 
that lasted through the entire boom period of the late 1990s.   
This pattern illustrates another important element to Figure 1 in addition to the 
cyclical variability:  a clear downward trend in the effective corporate tax rate.  The 
solid line labeled “trendline” tracks this decline.  It illustrates the average annual 
compounded rate of change over the entire period, which equals –2.3 percent (see 
methodology appendix for details; for ease of exposition, we will refer to the 
compounded rate simply as an annual average rate).  In other words, the ECITR for the 
U.S. states as a whole declined at an annual average rate of –2.3 percent between 1977 
and 2001.  Comparing the two endpoints of this trendline, the ECITR declined a total of 
41.2 percent (from 3.4 percent to 2.0 percent) between 1977 and 2001.  If the 1977 
trendline rate, 3.4 percent, had prevailed in 2001, states would have collected another 
$23.3 billion in corporate income taxes.8 According to data on corporate net income 
from the Internal Revenue Service, up to $5 billion of that amount is potentially 
attributable to the growth in income of S corporations, whose profits are passed 
through to their owners and taxed as personal income. After taking out this amount, 
states would still be left with another $18.3 billion in additional revenue. This is a 
                                                 
8 This amount is figured by comparing the two endpoints of the trendline.  If we used the actual amount 
of state corporate income taxes collected in 2001, the difference is similar: $18.9 billion. 
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significant amount; it would have covered nearly half of the $37 billion in budget 
shortfalls states faced in fiscal 2002 (NCSL 2002).   
Figure 1
Effective corporate income tax rates (ECITR), 
U.S. State government totals
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Source and notes.   Author's calculations (see methodology appendix for details).  Effective corporate income tax rates (ECITR) equal 
state government corporate income tax collections as a percent of state corporate income.  Recession dates and duration are drawn from 
NBER business cycle data; they represent peak to trough.  The trendline is based on the formula for continous compounding (see 
appendix for details), and is statistically significant at the 99 percent level.
Trendline
ECITR
 
 Turning to differences between the time periods depicted in Figure 1, the 
rate of change has increased in the most recent business cycle.  Measuring trough to 
trough, the more recent period (1991-2001) gives an annual average compounded rate of 
change of –4.4 percent; the prior period (1982-1991) gives a annual rate of –1.6 percent.  
These results indicate that the decline in corporate tax rates sped up significantly in the 
1990s, despite the fact that average annual economic growth of gross state product in 
the two periods was about equal (3.4 percent).  Summing the annual decline over the 
entire period, the ECITR declined a total of –35.4 percent (this compares with a decline 
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of only –13.3 percent in the 1982-1991 period).9  Once again, thinking in terms of the 
revenue impact of this decline, if 1991 rates had prevailed in 2001, states would have 
collected another $14.5 billion in tax revenue in fiscal 2002.  Correcting for the growth in 
income of S corporations during this period, the decline is $11 billion.10  This is 
equivalent to 30 percent of the states’ total budget gaps in fiscal 2002 ($37 billion).  
Now we turn to a state-by-state analysis, focusing on the period of more 
precipitous declines in the 1990s to investigate how these patterns have been distributed 
among the states. 
 
State-by State Analysis 
 Table 1 presents two measures of the change in the effective corporate income 
tax rate by state.  The first measure, entitled “period change,” figures the percent 
change in the tax rate from period A to period B.  Because corporate income taxes at the 
state level are highly variable in any one year, the tax rate in each period is an average 
over three years.11,12  Each period ends in a business cycle trough (1991 and 2001), and 
                                                 
9 Note that summing over the period is based on the formula for continuous compounding; see appendix 
for details. 
10 The figure used here for the impact of S corporations on state corporate tax revenue, $3.5 billion, is 
virtually the same as that figured in a report y the Multistate Tax Commission, $3.4 billion, which looked 
at a similar span of time (Multistate Tax Commission 2003). 
11 To further control for variability, each year’s ECITR is actually a three-year moving average.  The sum 
of corporate income tax revenues for the preceding, current and consequent years is divided by total 
corporate income for the same span to arrive at the current year’s ECITR.  See the appendix for details. 
12 Caution should be exercised in making inter-state comparisons of effective tax rate levels.  This is 
because some of the data we use on capital charges is national data, and there are potentially large 
differences between states in this data that make inter-state comparisons potentially problematic.  There 
is less likely to be variation within states over time, hence making inter-state comparisons of changes in 
effective tax rates is a reasonably reliable use of the national data. 
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includes the two years preceding that trough.13  The percent change between periods A 
and B shows the total amount, in percentages, that the ECITR has changed from the 
beginning to the end of the 1990s.  All 42 of the states evaluated experienced declines in 
the ECITR based on this measure.  Some of the declines are very significant:  
Connecticut experienced a 72 percent decline in its ECITR; Hawaii, Iowa and Rhode 
Island, more than –50 percent; Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana and Ohio, over –40 percent.  
The average decline for all 42 states was –29 percent.  
 
Table 1 
State Changes in the Effective Corporate Income Tax Rate 
 
Period change 
 Annual compounded          
rate of change 
 A 
avg 
ECITR, 
1989-1991 
B 
avg 
ECITR, 
1999-2001 
Percent 
change 
between 
A and B 
 
Average 
annual  rate  
1991-2001 
Total for   
the period,    
1991-2001 
Alabama 1.5% 1.1% -28.7%  -3.9%* -32.0% 
Alaskaa       
Arizona 1.9% 1.7% -11.5%  -2.6%** -22.9% 
Arkansas 1.9% 1.6% -13.7%  -2.5%* -21.8% 
California 3.5% 2.6% -26.6%  -3.9%* -32.0% 
Colorado 1.2% 1.1% -4.3%  0.1% 1.3% 
Connecticut 4.2% 1.2% -72.2%  -16.1%* -79.9% 
Delaware 2.9% 2.1% -29.2%  -3.1%* -26.4% 
Florida 1.7% 1.4% -17.1%  -2.6%** -22.5% 
Georgia 1.9% 1.2% -37.3%  -5.0%* -39.3% 
Hawaii 1.7% 0.7% -56.4%  -5.4%* -41.6% 
Idaho 2.5% 1.7% -33.7%  -5.7%* -43.4% 
                                                 
13 The analysis was also conducted using dates for state business cycles, which can be quite different 
from national business cycles.  See the appendix for further discussion of these state business cycle 
results. 
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 Period change 
 Annual compounded          
rate of change 
 A 
avg 
ECITR, 
1989-1991 
B 
avg 
ECITR, 
1999-2001 
Percent 
change 
between 
A and B 
 
Average 
annual  rate  
1991-2001 
Total for   
the period,    
1991-2001 
Illinois 1.8% 1.6% -11.1%  -1.8%** -16.1% 
Indiana 2.4% 2.3% -2.8%  -4.3%* -35.1% 
Iowa 1.9% 0.9% -51.1%  -7.4%* -52.0% 
Kansas 2.4% 1.4% -40.8%  -6.9%* -49.7% 
Kentucky 2.5% 1.4% -44.4%  -5.2%* -40.4% 
Louisiana 1.5% 0.8% -48.6%  -6.1%* -45.8% 
Maine 2.2% 1.8% -21.1%  -2.7%*** -23.4% 
Maryland 1.4% 1.3% -8.8%  -0.9%*** -9.0% 
Massachusetts 3.5% 2.4% -30.4%  -5.1%* -40.0% 
Michigana       
Minnesota 3.1% 2.2% -28.4%  -4.4%* -35.8% 
Mississippi 1.9% 1.7% -10.8%  -1.8%* -16.6% 
Missouri 1.3% 0.8% -36.2%  -5.5%* -42.5% 
Montana 3.1% 2.5% -20.8%  -2.7%* -23.4% 
Nebraska 1.6% 1.3% -21.7%  -3.5%* -29.5% 
Nevada NA NA NA  NA NA 
New Hampshirea       
New Jersey 3.0% 2.0% -32.6%  -3.3%* -27.8% 
New Mexico 1.3% 1.3% -3.1%  -1.1%*** -10.5% 
New York 2.9% 2.0% -30.7%  -6.1%* -45.6% 
North Carolina 2.5% 1.5% -40.8%  -6.9%* -49.6% 
North Dakota 2.5% 2.1% -14.8%  -3.9%** -32.0% 
Ohio 1.8% 1.0% -43.9%  -6.3%* -46.7% 
Oklahoma 1.4% 1.1% -16.4%  -3.4%* -28.8% 
Oregon 1.7% 1.1% -34.5%  -7.6%* -53.1% 
Pennsylvania 3.3% 2.0% -38.4%  -7.0%* -50.4% 
Rhode Island 1.7% 0.8% -52.2%  -10.3%* -64.1% 
South Carolina 1.5% 0.9% -36.7%  -6.2%* -45.9% 
South Dakotaa       
Tennessee 2.3% 1.9% -16.0%  -1.6%* -14.6% 
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 Period change 
 Annual compounded          
rate of change 
 A 
avg 
ECITR, 
1989-1991 
B 
avg 
ECITR, 
1999-2001 
Percent 
change 
between 
A and B 
 
Average 
annual  rate  
1991-2001 
Total for   
the period,    
1991-2001 
Texas NA NA NA  NA NA 
Utah 1.7% 1.2% -31.3%  -5.1%** -39.8% 
Vermont 1.6% 1.5% -10.2%  -2.1%** -19.3% 
Virginia 1.3% 0.9% -33.3%  -4.3%* -35.2% 
Washington NA NA NA  NA 0.0% 
West Virginia 4.0% 2.9% -27.2%  -2.4%* -21.7% 
Wisconsin 2.8% 1.7% -38.9%  -6.3%* -46.8% 
Wyoming NA NA NA  NA NA 
Source and notes:  Author’s calculations based on data and methodology described in the appendix.  
ECITR is the effective corporate income tax rate, figured as state corporate tax revenue as a percent of 
state corporate income; “NA” indicates not applicable because the state lacks a corporate income tax.  
Asterisks indicate level of statistical significance: * is significant at the 99 percent level, ** at the 95 
percent level, and *** at the 90 percent level. 
a Alaska, Michigan, New Hampshire and South Dakota were excluded due to the incompatibility of 
their corporate income tax systems with the corporate income base used in the analysis.  
 
The second measure, the annual compounded rate of change, is another way of 
looking at the same data, but it does not always indicate the same result because this 
method uses regression analysis to account for the years in between the two periods.  
Here there are two measures:  the average annual rate shows how much the ECITR 
changed on an annual basis between 1991 and 2001 (measuring from business cycle 
trough to trough). The total for the period sums up the annual changes.  It is this total 
that is directly comparable to the period change between A and B discussed above.  For 
all states that show a statistically significant rate of change (as indicated by an asterisk), 
the two measures are consistent with one another. 
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 Summarizing the results of average annual changes, of the 42 states evaluated, 41 
show statistically significant declines in the ECITR, with the 42nd state, Colorado, 
showing a small (0.1% per year), but statistically insignificant, positive change.  The 
annual declines range between –16.1 percent (for Connecticut) and –0.9% percent (for 
Maryland).  The average annual change for all states is –4.6 percent, compared to 4.4% 
for the U.S. states as a whole reported in the previous section.  This average annual 
change amounts to an average total change of –36.7 percent for the entire period.  
 Looking at the two measures together, it is clear that the vast majority of states 
have experienced a deterioration in their capacities to collect corporate income taxes. 
Some of this decline is due to changes in the federal tax base, as most states use federal 
taxable income as the starting point for determining state taxable income.  Fox and Luna 
(2002) figure that the federal corporate income tax base declined by about 10 percent 
over the course of the 1990s.  Dividing that by the effective corporate income tax rate 
decline for the U.S. states as a whole during this period, 35 percent, gives a rough 
estimate that declines in the federal tax base were responsible for about 29 percent of 
the decline in state tax rates. 
 In addition to federal tax policy, changes in state tax policy will affect corporate 
income tax revenue.  Peter Fisher, in a simulation of corporate taxation in 20 
manufacturing-intensive states between 1990 and 1998, estimates that state policies 
lowered effective corporate tax rates by about 30% (Fisher 2002).  The form of these 
policy effects cover a wide range.  Some states, such as Connecticut (which lowered 
corporate income tax rates from 11.5 percent in 1990 to 7.5 percent by 2001) and Arizona 
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(which lowered corporate income tax rates from 9.3 percent to 6.968 percent over the 
same period), have changed statutory rates on corporate income in ways that are 
reflected in effective corporate tax rates.  But the impact of policy shifts in most states is 
not as straightforward.  For example, because corporate profits come from doing 
business across many states and countries, states use “apportionment” formulas to 
figure out what proportion of profits is subject to taxation. Historically, the most 
common apportionment formula has equally weighted sales, payroll, and property, and 
the proportion of profits taxed has been based on the share of a corporation’s sales (one-
third weight), payroll (one-third weight) or property (one-third weight) located in that 
state.  This equal-weighted apportionment formula is now more the exception than the 
rule, with most states now at least double-weighting the sales factor (Fox and Luna 
2002).  This is partly the result of inter-state tax competition, as double-weighting the 
sales factor gives tax advantages to firms with a high proportion of out-of-state sales.  
And when a state adopts such policies, it is difficult for neighboring states to resist 
matching these tax advantages for potentially footloose firms.  Indeed, the problem of 
economic competition between the states, and their costs to state governments and 
citizens, has been a continuing area of concern among state policymakers.14  Combined 
with the increasing international mobility of firms, states are facing increasing pressures 
to produce more “business-friendly” tax environments. 
                                                 
14 For a good review of these issues, see the collection of papers written for the conference “Reigning in 
the Competition for Capital,” Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, February 
27-28, 2004. http://www.hhh.umn.edu/projects/prie/c4c_papers.htm 
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A third factor driving down corporate tax revenue is the increasing incidence of 
tax avoidance.  Corporations are using ever more complex strategies to shelter their 
profits from taxation (Department of the Treasury 1999).  Globalization has probably 
contributed to this problem, as multinational firms can engage in transfer pricing which 
inflates costs in high tax jurisdictions, and/or transfers profits to low tax jurisdictions 
(LMSB 2003).  A study by the Multistate Tax Commission on international and domestic 
tax sheltering activity by corporations estimated that compared to the 1980-89 period, 
state governments lost about $12.8 billion in corporate tax revenues in 2001 alone due to 
tax sheltering (Multistate Tax Commission 2003). The issue of tax avoidance overlaps 
with that of state tax policy, as sometimes states tacitly collude in this tax avoidance as 
they jockey for a competitive edge against other states in attracting business (Burstein 
and Rolnick 1994).  
As the yield of state corporate income taxes continues to decline, states 
increasingly face ongoing structural budget deficits that do not turn around when 
recessions recede.  That some states experienced less decline than others suggests that 
tax policies matter, and that there are alternatives to what appears to be a nearly 
universal trend.  In an increasingly integrated world, with a growing sense of 
competition for new business investment and expanded opportunities for corporate tax 
avoidance, incorporating the fact that there are alternatives should be a central aspect of 
policymaking.15      
                                                 
15 See Mazerov (2003) for a discussion of some of these alternatives, and Avi-Yonah (2004) for an overall 
defense of corporate taxation. 
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Methodology and Data Appendix 
 
 
Corporate income 
Corporate income by state is based on data from the National Income and 
Product Accounts on gross state product (GSP) and personal income by state.16 Gross 
state product is separated into the following three categories:  compensation of 
employees, indirect business taxes and nontax liabilities, and property-type income.  
Property-type income includes proprietors’ income and capital charges, which is further 
subdivided into the following categories (in principle, there is nothing less aggregated 
than the three categories of GSP mentioned above). 
 
Proprietors’ income 
income of unincorporated establishments17 with the inventory valuation 
adjustment (IVA)18 and the capital consumption allowance (CCA)19 
rental income of persons20 
 
Capital charges 
corporate profits before taxes with IVA and CCA 
net interest 
business transfer payments21 
subsidies less current surplus of government enterprises22 
government consumption of fixed capital 
 
From property-type income in GSP, we subtract “proprietors’ income with IVA 
and CCA” and the “rental income of persons,” both from the state’s personal income 
                                                 
16 It is important to note that GSP estimates are establishment-based, not company-based.  That is, 
production is measured in the states where the product is produced, not where it is reported by multi-
establishment companies for tax purposes.  The implication here is that profits shifted to other states for 
tax purposes are not reflected in state GSP, and hence the results will capture the tax effects of such 
sheltering. 
17 Current production income of sole proprietorships and partnerships and of tax exempt cooperatives.  
Also includes net rental income of owner-occupants of farm dwellings (BEA 2001). 
18 The inventory valuation adjustment is the difference between the cost of inventories withdrawals 
valued at acquisition cost, and the cost of inventory withdrawals valued at replacement cost (BEA 2001). 
19 The capital consumption allowance is the charge for the using up of fixed capital (BEA 2001). 
20 This includes the imputed net rental income of owner-occupants of nonfarm dwellings; the net current 
production income of persons from the rental of real property (except those primarily engaged in the real 
estate business); and royalties received by persons from patents, copyrights, and rights to natural 
resources (BEA 2001). 
21 Business transfer payments are payments made by businesses for which no current services are 
performed, and exist primarily of personal injury claims, corporate gifts to nonprofits, and taxes paid by 
domestic corporations to foreign governments (BEA 2001). 
22 Subsidies are grants paid by government agencies to private business and other government 
enterprises (BEA 2001).  
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account.  The result is an estimate of capital charges. Capital charges are an 
overstatement of corporate profits because they include the following categories which 
should not be categorized as corporate income: noncorporate net interest; subsidies less 
current surplus of government enterprises, and government consumption of fixed 
capital. 
 
Table A-1 shows the relative distribution of actual corporate income and these 
noncorporate income categories within capital charges, based on national data of GDP 
by industry, which records disaggregated data.23  There is a small but significant 
variability of actual corporate income relative to capital charges.  Moreover, actual 
corporate income is only about 70 percent of capital charges, which means estimates 
based on capital charges will be overstated.  To account for these differences, we take 
the percentage of capital charges represented by actual corporate income as indicated in 
Table A-1, and use that to figure the state-by-state estimates.  We will refer to the 
resulting estimate as corporate income, and it is the estimate of corporate profits used in 
the paper. 
 
Table A-1 
Proportion of Capital Charges (percent) 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Noncorporate 
net interest 
26.0 25.0 23.3 21.7 21.1 20.1 19.3 20.4 20.4 21.0 22.7 
Subsidies less 
current surplus 
of government 
enterprises 
-1.5 -1.6 -2.0 -1.6 -1.3 -1.2 -0.9 -1.1 -1.5 -1.5 -2.0 
Government 
consumption of 
fixed capital 
10.1 10.3 10.5 10.1 9.7 9.4 8.9 8.9 9.1 9.1 9.4 
Corporate 
income 
65.4 66.2 68.3 69.7 70.4 71.7 72.7 71.8 72.0 71.3 69.9 
Source and Notes: Author’s calculations based on BEA data on GDP by industry. Corporate income 
includes:  before-tax corporate profits with IVA; net corporate interest; business transfer payments; 
and corporate capital consumption allowances. 
 
 
                                                 
23 GDP by industry is the national counterpart to GSP, though GSP does not include charges associated 
with Federal operations overseas. 
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Corporate profits at the national level were figured by adding corporate profits 
with IVA and CCA, net corporate interest, and business transfer payments from GDP 
by industry in the NIPA tables. 
 
Effective corporate income tax rates (ECITR) 
Effective corporate income tax rates are state corporate income tax revenue as a 
percent of corporate income for that state.  Note that tax revenues are in fiscal years and 
corporate income in calendar years.  This is due to data limitations, as GSP is not 
published on a quarterly basis, and detailed quarterly data on state tax revenue only 
goes back to 1993.  Since taxes come due after the calendar year has ended, the ECITR 
uses tax revenue from the fiscal year that equals the calendar year used for corporate 
income plus one.24 
 
To control for variability, each year’s effective corporate income tax rate is a 3-
year moving average of the revenues and income in the years prior, current, and after 
the stated year.  That is, for year n, the ECITR is equal to: 
(TRn + TRn +1 + TRn+ 2) (CIn−1 + CIn + CIn+1) , where TR  equals state corporate tax revenue 
and is in fiscal years, and CI  equals corporate income and is in calendar years.  These 
figures were rendered in real dollars.  Because the U.S. state total has less variability, we 
do not use moving averages for these figures. 
 
Price deflators 
For state tax revenue, we used the consumer price index-urban published by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.  For corporate income, we used the national GDP deflator 
published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Deflators derived from state-
specific data on GSP did not yield significantly different results. 
 
State tax revenue data 
All tax revenue data are from the U.S. Census Bureau, with the exception of 
Florida and Illinois.  For Florida, because of large differences between Census and state 
data, figures on corporate income tax revenue were taken directly from March 2004 
Revenue Estimating Conference Comparison Report, Office of Economic and Demographic 
Research, The Florida Legislature.  Illinois data are from the Illinois Department of 
Revenue’s Annual Report, and include only corporate income taxes collected on behalf of 
the state.  Illinois also has a personal property replacement tax (PPRT), a tax collected 
for local governments.  Although the PPRT is a tax on corporate income, we did not 
account for it in our figures because it is also levied on partnerships and other forms of 
non-corporate businesses, whose income is not included in the base; and  it is 
distributed to local governments, so it is not comparable to the state tax revenue figures 
reported for other states.  We did, however, use only Census data for the figures on U.S. 
totals.  The latter does not include Washington, D.C.   
                                                 
24  Using the same fiscal and calendar year was also tried; the core results are the same. 
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Tax revenue data refer to state fiscal years that end on June 30 in all but four 
states:  New York, which ends on March 31; Texas, on August 31; and Alabama and 
Michigan, on September 30. 
 
State versus National Business Cycles 
 The analysis in the paper uses data on the national business cycle in order to 
compare economically similar points in time.  However, state business cycles can differ 
significantly from the national business cycles.  Using data on state GSP growth, we 
also ran the figures using state business cycles.  Twenty of the 42 states had business 
cycle beginning or end dates that differed from the national cycle.  For the most part, 
there were no significant differences in the results:  the state business cycle-based 
period change average was 27.9%, compared to the national business cycle-based 
average of 28.8% reported in the paper.  The states for which there were significant 
differences are reported in the table A-2.  A good part of these differences has to do 
with the different number of years in the state versus national business cycles.  The 
longer the time period, the more of a decline one is going to capture, since ECITRs are 
clearly undergoing a secular decline.  For overall consistency, we decided it best to use 
national business cycle data.   
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Table A-2 
Comparing State and National Business Cycle Data 
 
 Using state  
business cycle data 
 Using national  
business cycle data 
 
Period 
change 
Sum of 
annual 
average  
Period 
change 
Sum of 
annual 
average 
Colorado -19.1% -3.5%  -4.3% 1.3% 
Delaware -8.5% -7.4%  -29.2% -26.4% 
Hawaii -21.9% 24.9%  -56.4% -41.6% 
Oklahoma -4.3% -18.6%  -16.4% -28.8% 
Source and notes:  Author’s calculations based on data described in this appendix.  The 
national business cycle is 1991-2001.   The state business cycles used were the following:  
Colorado, 1989-2001; Delaware, 1992-1998; Hawaii, 1996-2001; and Oklahoma, 1989-2001. 
 
Annual average compounded rate of change 
In order to calculate the average annual compounded rate of change, we used the 
following standard formula for continuous compounding:  y = Aert .  Then, taking 
natural logs, we get:  ln y = lnA + rt .  We then used regression analysis to figure , the 
average annual compounded rate of change, where  equals the effective corporate 
income tax rate, and 
r
y
t equals time.  To calculate the total decline over the entire period, 
we used the following formula:  ytdt = Aertdt = ert∫∫ t0tend = ert −1 . 
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